Abstract-An anonymous single sign-on (ASSO) scheme allows users to access multiple services anonymously using one credential. We propose a new ASSO scheme, where users can access services anonymously through the use of anonymous credentials and unlinkably through the provision of designated verifiers. Notably, verifiers cannot link a user's service requests even if they collude. The novelty is that when a designated verifier is unavailable, a central authority can authorize new verifiers to authenticate the user on behalf of the original verifier. Furthermore, a central verifier can also be authorized to de-anonymize users and trace their service requests. We formalize the scheme along with a security proof and provide an empirical evaluation of its performance. This scheme can be applied to smart ticketing where minimizing the collection of personal information of users is increasingly important to transport organizations due to privacy regulations such as general data protection regulations (GDPRs).
to access multiple intended services. The ticket consists of a set of authentication tags that can only be validated by designated verifiers. Designated verifiers can validate their corresponding tags and cannot link a user's service requests, even if they collude. A third party, referred to as a central verifier, can de-anonymize a user's identity and trace her service requests.
In a transport application a ticket could represent an intended route of travel (e.g. from A to B to C). Traditionally, in the rail industry, tickets were paper based and hence anonymous. In the context of smart ticketing, which is one of the main digital strategies of the UK rail industry [9] , customers' data may be stored when buying tickets. Thus, it will be important to consider passenger privacy in order to minimize the collection of personal information to reflect the requirements of the recently introduced General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) [10] . Nonetheless, a smart ticketing solution will still need to provide guarantees as to who owns and uses a rail ticket. Using an anonymous scheme such as Han et al. [8] means that passenger information leakage between different companies is prevented because each train operating company is considered to be a separate designated verifier. However, the inclusion of a central verifier allows the relevant transport authorities to identify passengers and their journeys. This is important in the case of an emergency to enable transport authorities to know who the passengers using their transport systems are. It could also provide guards on a train access a user's whole journey information in order to provide the best journey advice during travel if appropriate.
In [8] , an authentication tag can only be validated by a designated service provider, hence a user cannot access the services if the service provider is off-line or unavailable. In a cloud environment and when a service provider is off-line, a user would expect to be redirected to an alternative provider offering a similar service. While for a transport application (in the case of disruption), a ticket should still be valid and authorized for use on a redirected route. For example, a journey from A to C via B could be redirected to go via D and/or E when B is disrupted. In such cases a user should not be required to buy or change her ticket in order to access the alternative route. Moreover, in practice, the entities who hold the disruption information are disconnected from those who sell tickets. Therefore, rail authorities and train companies should manage and be responsible for the redirected travel routes and disruption information with minimal impact on users.
In this paper, we propose a new ASSO scheme which extends the scheme presented in [8] to allow a central authority to authorize another verifier to act as a proxy and validate the authentication tags for a service provider that is unavailable. In the ticket scenario it thus provides a central authority with the ability to allow a proxy verifier to validate a user's ticket. Hence, proxy re-verification does not increase a user's authentication burden in case of a disruption, i.e. a user does not need to change her ticket. Our new scheme also preserves the following features from the original scheme of Han et al. [8] :
1) Multiple Access: a user can use one ticket to access multiple distinct services; 2) Anonymity: a user can obtain a ticket from a ticket issuer without releasing anything about her PII to the ticket issuer, especially, the ticket issuer cannot determine whether two ticket are issued to the same user or two different users; 3) Unlinkability: a designated verifier can determine whether a user is authorized to access its service but cannot link a user's different service requests nor collude with other verifiers to link a user's service requests; 4) Unforgeability: tickets can only be issued by ticket issuers and cannot be forged by other parties even the central authority; 5) Traceability: only the central verifier can de-anonymize a user and trace the identities of the verifiers whose services the user is authorized to access; 6) Double Spending Detection: designated verifiers can detect and prevent a user from making two authentication requests using the same authentication tag but cannot de-anonymize the user; Contributions: Our main contributions in this paper are summarised as follows: (1) an ASSO with proxy re-verification scheme providing the above features is formally constructed; (2) the definition and security model are formalized; (3) the scheme has been implemented and an empirical efficiency analysis is presented; (4) the security of our scheme is formally reduced to well-known complexity assumptions.
The novelty of this paper is to prevent information leakage across multiple verifiers and implement proxy re-verification. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first scheme to support users anonymously and unlinkably authenticating to multiple service providers and allowing authorized proxy verifiers to verify authentication on behalf of an original designated verifier when that verifier is unavailable.
A. Related Work
In this subsection, we review the work which is most closely related to our scheme. Previous authentication schemes mainly address the anonymity of users and implement multiple authentications using one credential.
1) Anonymous Single-Sign-On schemes: Elmufti et al. [4] proposed an ASSO scheme which is suitable to the Global System for Mobile communication (GSM). In [4] , to access a service, a user needs to generate a new one-time identity and uses it to authenticate to a trusted third party (TTP).
If the authentication is successful, the TTP forwards the user's one-time identity to the service provider who provides the service. As a result, the service provider cannot infer the user's real identity from this one-time identity. However, in our scheme, users can authenticate to service providers directly without the need of a TTP.
Han et al. [5] proposed a generic construction of dynamic SSO schemes where digital signature, broadcast encryption and zero-knowledge proof are adopted. In [5] , after registering with the system, a user obtains a credential which is the encryption of a signature generated by the central authority on a set of service selected by the user and her public key. Consequently, only the service providers whose services have been selected by the user can decrypt the ciphertext and validate the signature. To prevent sharing a credential, a user needs to prove the knowledge of her secret key corresponding to the public key included in the credential. Hence, a user is anonymous only to the service providers who are not included in the credential. Nevertheless, unlike in our scheme, service providers know the user's identity (public key) and link her service requests.
Wang et al. [6] proposed an ASSO scheme based on group signatures [11] . When registering to the central authority, a user is issued a group member key. Then, to access a service, a user generates a group signature by using her group member key. A service provider checks whether the user is authorized to access services by validating the correctness of the signature. Furthermore, the central authority can use the open algorithm in the group signature scheme to trace a user's identity. Notably, a user can access all services in the system, while in our scheme a user can only access the selected services.
Lee [7] proposed an efficient ASSO scheme based on Chebyshev Chaotic Maps. When joining the system, an issuer (the smart card processing center) issues temporary secret keys to users and service providers. To access a service, a user interacts with a service provider to generate a session key by using their respective temporary secret keys. A service request is granted if and only if the session key can be generated correctly; otherwise, the request is denied. However, unlike our scheme, each service provider knows the identity of the user accessing his service. Hence, multiple service providers can profile a user's service requests if they collude. Moreover, a user can again access all services in the system, while in our scheme a user can only access the selected services.
2) Proxy Re-Encryption: Mambo and Okamoto [12] introduced the definition of proxy cryptosystems that enable a delegator to delegate the decryption power to a delegatee. Later, Blaze et al. [13] proposed an atomic proxy cryptography scheme where a semi-trusted third party called proxy can convert ciphertexts for one user into ciphertexts for another user if the third party is given a proxy key.
Shamir [14] introduced an identity-based cryptosystem is a public key cryptosystem where a user's public key can be any arbitrary string and her secret key is obtained from a trusted central authority. Boneh and Franklin [15] first proposed a practical identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme based on paring. Green and Ateniese [16] introduced the concept of identity-based proxy re-encryption (IBPRE) where a proxy can convert a ciphertext for the original decryptor to a ciphertext for a designated decryptor if the proxy obtains a re-encryption key from the original decrytor. Han et al. [17] classified IBPRE schemes into two types according to the generation of re-encryption keys: (1) re-encryption keys are generated by the trusted central authority [18] , [19] ; (2) re-encryption keys are generated by the original decryptors [16] , [20] . In [16] and [18] [19] [20] , given a re-encryption key, a proxy can convert all ciphertexts for the original decryptor to ciphertexts for the designated decryptor. The differences between our scheme and IBPRE schemes are: (1) a proxy is not required; (2) a re-key only enables a proxy verifier to validate tickets on behalf the original verifier in a specified period, instead of all tags.
3) Designated Verifier Schemes: Jakobsson et al. [21] introduced a designated verifier signature (DVS) scheme which is a digital signature scheme where a signature can only be verified by a single designated verifier. Furthermore, the verifier cannot convince others that a signature is from the real signer since the verifier could have generated the signature by himself. Fan et al. [22] presented an attribute-based DVS scheme where a signature can be verified by a group of verifiers whose attributes satisfies specified values. In our scheme, we adopt the high level concept of a designated verifier, i.e. given a valid authentication tag, only the corresponding designated verifier and the authorized proxy verifiers can validate it. The main difference between these DVS schemes [21] , [22] and our scheme is that only the designated verifiers can verify a signature in DVS schemes, while in our scheme, everyone can verify a tag's signature generated by the ticket issuer but only the designated verifier of the tag can determine for whom it was generated.
Kuchta et al. [23] proposed an identity-based strong designated verifier group signature (ID-SDVGS) scheme that can provide the features of both designated verifier signatures and identity-based group signatures. In this scheme, all entities must obtain secret keys from a trusted third party referred to as "private key generator" (PKG). When joining the group, each user obtains a member credential from the group manager (GM). Then, a user can use her credential to anonymously generate a signature which can only be verified by the designated verifier and can be opened/de-anonymized by the GM. The verifier cannot convince others that the signature is from the real signer since the verifier can generate the signature by himself. However, in our scheme, only the secret keys of ticket verifiers are issued by the central authority. The secret keys of other entities including the ticket issuer, users and the central verifier are generated by themselves. Authentication tags can only be generated by the ticket issuer and its correctness can be publicly verified. Nevertheless, other entities cannot know for whom a tag is generated except the designated verifier.
4) k-Time Anonymous Authentication Schemes:
Anonymous authentication schemes enable a user to authenticate to a verifier without releasing her PII to the verifier. To limit the authentication time, Teranishi et al. [24] proposed a k-time anonymous authentication (k-TAA) scheme where users register with a central authority and obtain an anonymous credential. A verifier generates k authentication tags. For each access, a user proves to the verifier that she has obtained a valid credential from the central authority and selects a fresh authentication tag. As a result, no party can identify a user if she authenticates no more than k times, while any party can identify a user if she authenticates more than k times. In [24] , the central authority decides a user's access permission and service verifiers do not have control on the access permissions.
Camenisch et al. [25] proposed a periodic k-TAA scheme where a user can anonymously authenticate herself to a service verifier no more than k times in a given time period. The authentication tags automatically refresh every time period. When a user makes an anonymous authentication request, she proves to a verifier that she has obtained a valid credential (CL signature [26] ) from the central authority. Lastly, Camenisch et al. proposed an identity mixer scheme [27] , [28] in which users need to obtain a credential for their attributes. To access a service, a user proves to the service verifier that she has the required attributes.
In all these schemes [24] , [25] , [27] [28] [29] , authentication is not bound to a particular verifier, whereas in our scheme an authentication tag can only be verified by a designated verifier. Furthermore, k-TAA schemes allow verifiers to de-anonymize a user's identity when she has authenticated more than k times, while in our scheme a service verifier can detect whether a user has used the tag (double spending) but cannot de-anonymize a user's identity. Notably, our scheme allows a central verifier to de-anonymize a user and trace her service requests.
In Table I , we compare our scheme with related ASSO schemes in terms of anonymity, the inclusion of a designated verifier, traceability, re-verification, whether a trusted third party (TTP) is required to authenticate users on behalf of service provers as well as efficiency which mainly considers whether bilinear groups are required or not.
B. Paper Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following sections. Section II provides a high-level overview of our scheme and its security requirements. Section III introduces the formal definition and security model. Section IV presents the preliminaries for our scheme and a formal construction of our scheme is given in Section V. Section VI and Section VII present the security proof and the performance evaluation of our scheme, respectively. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. SCHEME OVERVIEW AND SECURITY PROPERTIES
The notation used throughout this paper is summarised in Table II. Our ASSO with proxy re-verification scheme consists of the following entities:
• a trusted central authority, CA, which initialises the system, issues credentials to other entities in the scheme and authorizes proxy verification; • a user, U, who wants to access some distinct services anonymously and unlinkabily;
• a ticket issuer, I, issues tickets to registered, yet anonymous users for a set of selected services; • a designated verifier, V, who can only validate the authentication tags generated for him and cannot link a user's service requests; • an authentication tag, T ag V , which is bound to a user U and a designated verifier V and is used to convince V that U is authorized to access its service; • a ticket, T U , which consists of a set of authentication tags generated for the designated verifiers of the requested services; • a central verifier, CV, which is another trusted third party which, given a ticket T U , can de-anonymize the identities of the user and trace her service requests.
A. Overview of Proposed Scheme
A simplified pictorial description of our scheme is presented in Fig. 1 . CA initialises the system. When joining the system, I, U, V and CV authenticate to the CA and obtain their credentials from CA. To buy a ticket, U sends her service information J U consisting of a set of verifiers' identities I D V to I. Subsequently, I generates a ticket T U for U. The ticket comprises a set of tags T U = {T ag V |I D V ∈ J U } ∪ {T ag C V } which can only be validated by the corresponding designated verifiers. When being validated by V, U sends the corresponding tag T ag V to V. In the case that U's service information needs to be traced, CV is allowed to trace the whole service information of U given a ticket T U . Especially, when the original verifier V is unavailable, CA can authorize a new verifier V to validate the tag on behalf of V.
B. Security Properties of Our Scheme
Having defined the different entities and described how they interact, we now list the security properties of our scheme:
1) Anonymity: a user can obtain a ticket from a ticket issuer anonymously;
2) Unlinkability: a designated verifier cannot link a user's different service requests nor collude with other verifiers to link a user's service requests;
3) Unforgeability: tickets are generated by ticket issuers and cannot be forged by other parties even the central authority; 4) Traceability: given a valid ticket, CV can de-anonymize the ticket holder and trace her service requests; 5) Proxy Re-Verification: in the case that a designated verifier V is unavailable, CA can assign one or more verifiers V to validate a user's tag designated for V; 6) Double Spending: a designated verifier can detect whether a tag has been used or not, but cannot de-anonymize the user.
III. FORMAL DEFINITION AND SECURITY REQUIREMENT
In this section, we review the formal definition and security requirement of ASSO with proxy re-verification. The formal definition of ASSO with proxy re-verification is defined using a series of algorithms and is given in the full version of this paper (see [30, Sec. 
III]).

A. Security Requirements
The security model of our scheme is defined by the following three games.
1) Unforgeability: This is used to define the unforgeability of tickets, namely even if users, verifiers and the central verifier collude, they cannot forge a valid ticket. This game is formalized in the full version (see Section III in [30] ).
2) Unlinkability: This is used to define the unlinkability, namely even if some ticket verifiers collude with potential users, they cannot profile the whole service information of other users. We assume that I and CV cannot be compromised because they can know a user's whole service information by themselves. The game is formalized in the full version (see [30, Sec. 
III]).
3) Traceability: This is used to formalize the traceability of tickets, namely even if a group of users collude, they cannot generate a ticket which CV would not catch as belonging to some member of the colluding group. We suppose that the ticket issuer is honest. This game is formalized in the full version (see [30, Sec . III]).
IV. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, the preliminaries used in this paper are introduced.
A. Bilinear Group
Let G 1 , G 2 and G τ be cyclic groups with prime order p. A map e : G 1 × G 2 → G τ is a bilinear map/pairing if it satisfies the following properties [15] : (g, h) . (e, p, G 1 , G 2 , G τ ) . Bilinear maps can be divided into three types [31] : Type-I: G 1 = G 2 ; Type-II:
Type-III: G 1 = G 2 but there is no efficient map between G 1 and G 2 . Type-III pairings are the most efficient pairings [32] . Our scheme is based on Type-III pairings where the size of elements in G 1 is short (160 bits).
B. Complexity Assumptions
Definition 1 (Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption [33] ): Let G be a cyclic group with prime order p and g be a generator of G. Given Y ∈ G, we say that the DL assumption holds on G if all PPT adversaries can output a number x ∈ Z p such that Y = g x with a negligible advantage, namely
The proof of the traceability property of our scheme is reduced to the DL assumption.
Definition 2 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Assumption [15] ): Let BG (1 ) → (e, p, G, G τ ) where , g a , g b , g c , ϒ) , we say that the DBDH assumption holds on (e, p, G, G τ ) if all PPT adversary A can distinguish ϒ = e(g, g) abc from a random element R ∈ G τ with a negligible advantage, namely
The security of the Boneh-Franklin IBE used to implement flexible verification was reduced to the DBDH assumption.
Definition 3 (Decisional asymmetric Bilinear DiffieHellman (DaBDH) Assumption [32] ): Let BG (1 ) →  (e, p, G 1 , G 2 , G τ ) and g, g be generators of G 1 and G 2 , , g a , g b , g c , g b , g c , ϒ) , we say that the DaBDH assumption holds on (e, p, G 1 , G 2 , G τ ) if all PPT adversaries can distinguish ϒ = e(g, g) abc from a random element R ∈ G τ with a negligible advantage, namely Adv The DaBDH assumption is used to prove the unlinkablity of our scheme.
Definition 4 ((JoC Version) q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (JoC-q-SDH) Assumption [34] ): Let BG (1 ) → (e, p, G 1 ,
2 , we say that the JoC-q-SDH assumption holds on (e, p,
The unforgeability of our scheme is reduced to the JoC-q-SDH assumption.
C. Zero-Knowledge Proof
We follow the definition introduced by Camenish and Stadler [35] and formalized by Camenish et al. [36] .
we denote a zero knowledge proof on knowledge of integers x 1 , x 2 and x 3 such that ϒ = g x 1 h x 2 andΥ = g x 1 h x 3 hold on the groups G = g = h andG = g = h, respectively. The convention is that the letters in the parenthesis (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) stand for the knowledge which is being proven, while the other parameters are known by the verifier.
D. BBS+ Signature
This signature was proposed by Au et al. [37] . Its security was reduced to the q-SDH assumption in Type-II pairing setting in [37] . Recently, Camenisch et al. [38] reduced its security to the JoC-q-SDH assumption in Type-III pairing setting.
Theorem 1 (Camenisch et al. [38] ): The BBS+ signature is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks (EU-CMA) if the JoC-q-SDH assumption holds on the bilinear group (e, p, G 1 , G 2 , G τ ) .
E. Boneh-Franklin Identity-Based Encryption
Boneh and Franklin [15] proposed the first IBE scheme based on the Type-I pairing: e : G × G → G τ .
Theorem 2 (Boneh and Franklin [15] ): This IBE scheme is secure against chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) if the DBDH assumption holds on the bilinear map group (e, p, G, G τ ) .
Abdalla et al. [39] observed that Boneh-Franklin IBE [15] is an anonymous IBE scheme where ciphertext does not release the identity of the receiver. Chatterjee and Menezes [32] transferred Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme from Type-I pairing setting to Type-III pairing setting, and claimed that the security of the transferred scheme can be reduced to DaBDH assumption. In this paper, the Boneh and Franklin [15] IBE scheme is applied to implement proxy re-verification.
V. CONSTRUCTION OF OUR SCHEME
A. Formal Construction
The formal construction of our ASSO with proxy re-verification scheme including messages sent between its entities and their relevant computations is presented in Fig. 2,  Fig. 3, Fig. 4, Fig. 5, Fig. 6, Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 . Notably, Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 are new in our scheme compared to Han et al. 's construction in [8] and Fig. 3, Fig. 4 have been modified to reflect the IBPRE scheme used.
B. High-Level Overview
At a high level, our scheme works as follows. 1) Setup: CA initializes the system and generates a master secret key M SK = (α, β) and the corresponding public parameters P P. Actually, α is used to issue credentials to I, U and CV when they join the system, while β is used to issue secret keys to Vs. 
are generated by CA using the master secret key α and are BBS+ signatures on the public keys Y I , Y U and Y C V , respectively. When joining the system, Vs only submit their identities to CA. CA uses the master secret key β to generate a secret key SK V for the identity I D V of V. This is one of the main differences in the scheme's construction compared to Han et al. [8] where the verifiers generate their own secretpublic key pairs. Moving this generation to the CA is required to facilitate the proxy re-verification. Furthermore, the CA generates a credential (d v , e v , σ V ) for V which is a BBS+ signature on I D V . CV stores ((d v , e v , σ V ) , SK V ), and sends them to V.
3) Ticket Issuing: To buy a ticket, U determines her service information J U consisting of the identities of the corresponding V whose services U wants to access. Furthermore, for each I D V ∈ J U , U generates a pseudonym (P V , Q V ) using her secret key and proves to I that she is a registered user and the pseudonyms are generated correctly ( generates an authentication tag T ag V 
are used by a proxy verifier V to validate T ag V on behalf of V in a specified time period TP. Since T P is embedded in E 3 V it is used to restrict the time of proxy re-verification to reflect that time period. In a rail application, a T P could be the travel day printed on the ticket (e.g. September 1, 2018) and can be decided by the ticket issuer.
Additionally, within the tag 
H 1 (I D V ) ). If it holds, V is a designated verifier; otherwise, V is not. In this paper, we assume that V is clear and U does not need to confirm it. For example in the rail scenario, the verifier/station is clear to U.
5) Ticket Trace:
To de-anonymize a user and trace her service requests, CV initialises a set U . Given a ticket T U , CV uses his secret key to de-anonymize U from the pseudonyms (P V , Q V ) for I D V ∈ J U and traces the service request from (E 2 V , K V ). Finally, CV can determine U's service requests by recording all the identities I D V ∈ U .
6) Proxy Key Generation:
In the case that a verifier V is unavailable, CA can authorize a proxy verifier V to validate the tag T ag V in a ticket T U by issuing a re-key RK V→V to V . RK V→V is generated by using both secret keys SK V and SK V . To limit the proxy verification period, a time period T P, which is embedded in E 3 V during the Ticket Issuing, is also embedded in RK V→V so that only tickets within that T P period can be validated by the proxy verifier. To prevent an unauthorized verifier from claiming to be a legal proxy, the CA or another trusted third party should broadcast the proxy information (I D V ) to both U and V . For example, in a rail scenario, when a station V is unavailable and an alternative plan is provided, both the user U and the proxy V need to be notified.
7) Proxy Ticket Validation:
To verify a tag T ag V on behalf of V, V sends the identity I D V to U. U returns the tag T ag V to V and proves the knowledge included in T ag V . If the proof is correct, V validates T ag V by using his secret key SK V and the re-key RK V←V . Both the user and the proxy verifier V know that V is a proxy for the verifier V as discussed above. For example, in a transport application a public announcement would identify the alternative route and hence the corresponding proxy verifier to the user.
C. Correctness
The correctness of our scheme and the details of the zeroknowledge proofs of 
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the security of our scheme is formally proven.
Theorem 3: Our scheme described in Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig. 4 , Fig. 5, Fig. 6, Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 is (, ())-unforgeable if  and only if the (q, () )-JoC-q-SDH assumption holds on the bilinear group (e, p, G 1 , G 2 , G τ ) and H 1 , H 2 and H 3 are secure cryptographic hash functions, where is the number of ticket issuing queries made by the adversary A, < q and
Proof (Sketch):
The unforgeability of our scheme is due to the unforgeability of the BBS+ signature [38] . The strategy used to prove the unforgeability of our scheme is as follows. If there exists an adversary A which can break the unforgeability of our scheme, we can construct an algorithm B which can use A to break the JoC-q-SDH assumption. Let
an thus implicitly sets the secret key of I as x i = x. In our scheme, a ticket is a BBS+ signature on the selected services
) and auxiliary information (T ext 1 and T ext 2 ). When the adversary A makes a ticket issuing query, a ticket is generated by using the technique deveoped in the proof of BBS+ signature [38] . For other queries, B first generates secret keys for CA, V and CV, and then uses them to respond A's queries. Since the unforgeability of BBS+ signature was reduced to JoC-q-SDH assumption, B can use A to break the JoC-q-SDH assumptions if A can forge a ticket.
The formal proof of Theorem 3 is presented in the full version (see [30, Sec. 
VI]).
Theorem 4: Our scheme described in Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig. 4 , Fig. 5, Fig. 6, Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 (e, p, G 1 , G 2 , G τ ) , H 1 , H 2 and H 3 are secure cryptographic hash functions, and H 2 is a random oracle, where () ≥ () 2e(1+q VA ) , e ≈ 2.71 is the natural logarithm, q VA is the number of ticket verifiers selected by A to query the Ticket-VerifierReg oracle.
is ()-unlinkable if and only if the ()-DaBDH assumption holds on the bilinear group
Proof (Sketch): The unlinkability of our scheme is due to the security and anonymity of the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme [15] . The strategy used to prove the unlinkability of our scheme is as follows. If there exists an adversary A which can break the unlinkability of our scheme, we can construct an algorithm B which can use A to break the DaBDH assumption. Given (g, g, g a , g b , g c , g b , g c , ϒ) γ . B selects two hash functions: H 1 : {0, 1} * → Z p and H 3 : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} and sets H 2 as a random oracle defined in [15] . B sets the public parameters as P P =  (e, p, G 1 , G 2 , G τ ,g, g, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , g, ϑ 1 , ϑ 2 , Y A ,Ỹ A , H 1 , H 3 ) , an thus implicitly sets the secret key of CA as M SK = (α, b). We suppose that both I and CV cannot be corrupted by A as each of them can link the services in a ticket. B sets the secret-public key pairs of I and CV to be (
When A makes a H 2 query on an identity I D V , B responses A with a value H 2 (I D V ) by using the technique developed in [15] where g c is used. When A makes a registration query for a verifier V, B first generates a secret key SK V for V by using the key generation technique introduced in [15] , and then generates a BBS+ signature σ are generated by using x cv . The signature on the pseudonym, authentication tag and auxiliary information is generated by using x i . B sends the challenged ticket T * U to A. A outputs his guess ρ on ρ. If ρ = ρ, B can use A to break the DaBDH assumption since the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme is secure and anonymous under the DaBDH assumption [15] . The probability is obtained by using the calculation method introduced in [15] .
The formal proof of Theorem 4 is presented in in the full version (see [30, Sec. 
VI]).
Theorem 5: Our scheme described in Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig. 4 , Fig. 5, Fig. 6, Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 is (, () 
, is the total number of ticket issuing queries made by A and < q. Proof (Sketch): The strategy used to prove the traceability of our scheme is derived from the group signature scheme [40] and is as follows. Each pseudonym is an EIGamal encryption of a user's public key under the CA's public key and (E 2 V , K V ) included in an authentication tag is the encryption of the verifier V's identity under the CA's public key. Furthermore, a ticket in our scheme is a BBS+ signature on the on
If A can generate a ticket which cannot be traced to the real user, the following two types of forgers are considered. Type-I forger outputs a ticket which includes a new pseudonym which has not been used to buy a ticket. Type-II forger outputs a ticket which includes a pseudonym which has been used to buy a ticket but can be traced to a different user. If the Type-I forger succeeds, B can use A to break the JoC-q-SDH assumption due to the unforgeability of the BBS+ signature scheme as A forges a BBS+ signature. For the Type-II forger, when buying a ticket, A needs to generates a proof of the knowledge included in the pseudonym. If the Type-II forger succeeds, B can use it to break the DL assumption by using the rewinding technique.
The proof of Theorem 5 is presented in the full version (see [30, Sec. VI] ).
Notably, other entities including the CA, verifiers V and users U cannot trace a user's services even if they collude. Because, for each selected service, a user associates it with a pseudonym which is an EIGamal encryption of her public key under the CV's public key. Moreover, each authentication tag consists of a Boneh-Franklin IBE encryption [15] for the verifier and an EIGamal encryption of the verifier's identity under the CV's public key. Therefore, no entity can link a user's services by using her pseudonyms and authentication tags, except the CV. This property is very important to protect users' privacy and trace users if required.
VII. BENCHMARKING
In this section we evaluate the performance of our scheme. The source code of the scheme's implementation is available at [41] and its performance has been measured on a Dell Inspiron Latitude E5270 laptop with an Intel Core i7-6600U CPU, 1TB SSD and 16GB of RAM running Fedora 28. The implementation makes use of bilinear maps defined over elliptic curves as well as other cryptographic primitives. For the bilinear maps, we used the JPBC library [42] wrapper for the C-based implementation of the PBC libraries [43] while bouncycastle [44] provides the other cryptographic primitives required by our scheme. Note that the implementation by Han et al. [8] was based on a Java implementation.
Recall from Section IV that our scheme requires a Type III bilinear map, e : G 1 × G 2 → G τ . The PBC library [43] provides such an instances in the form of the "Type F" pairing which is based on the elliptic curve E : y 2 = x 3 +b. The order of groups G 1 , G 2 and G τ is determined by the group of points on the elliptic curve, # E(F q ) = p. Note that the Type F curve is a pairing-friendly Barreto-Naehrig (BN) elliptic curve [45] . In our implementation, we instantiate the Type F curve using r Bits = 256 and r Bits = 638 where r Bits indicates the number of bits needed to represent the prime p.
These bit sizes were chosen to follow the default values specified in the ECC-DAA standard [46] for these curves. Notably, there have been recent attacks [47] , [48] against BN curves which reduced of the security of an implementation based on the 256-bit curve. However, the 638-bit curve is still considered to be secure.
For the hash functions H 1 : {0, 1} * → Z p , H 2 : {0, 1} * → G 2 and H 3 : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} ( < ) required by our scheme (see Fig 2) , we used S H A − 256 for both H 1 and H 3 while for H 2 (the random oracle hash function), we used S H A−256 and the "newRandomElementfromHash()" method in the JPBC library to construct an element of G 2 .
A. Timings Table III shows the results of the computational time spent in those phases of our scheme that required more complex computations (i.e. some form of verification using bilinear maps or generation of zero knowledge proofs). The timings shown have been calculated as the average over 50 iterations.
The set-up phase is a one off process run by the CA and only takes 233ms for r Bits = 256 or 971ms for r Bits = 638. During the registration phase of the protocol, the generation of credentials by the CA for the central verifier, CV, takes the most computational effort (8ms and 42ms) as this involves the creation of two credentials. The first credential is equivalent to creating a user credential while the second one is the equivalent of creating a credential for a designated verifier. Similarly, the verification of the CV's credentials requires the most computational effort (150ms or 782ms for 256 bits and 638 bits respectively). Note that because of this, it is unsurprising that the timings for a user and a verifier in this phase add up to almost the exact number for the CV.
The ticket issuing phase of our implementation is also reasonably fast when r Bits = 256. For example, when requesting 4 services, the whole process takes ≈ 646ms, 44ms to generate the request, 291ms to produce the ticket and 311ms to verify that the ticket is valid. Even when increasing the field size to 638 bits, the whole issuing process takes ≈ 3243ms of which 1432ms is spent on the actual ticket generation by the issuer. Note that a user can pre-compute her ticket request thus shortening the interaction with the issuer by 44ms or 195ms for 256-bits and 638-bits respectively). The issuer, on the other hand, can also pre-compute some values as part of the ticket issuing process (e.g. D V , E 1 V , E 2 V , K V and parts of Z V , cf. Fig. 4 ). This can reduce the ticket issuing phase by another 193ms or 965ms for 256-bits and 638-bits respectively.
In the validation phase, verifying an individual tag by a designated verifier only takes ≈ 85ms or ≈ 441ms for r Bits = 256 and r Bits = 638 respectively while acting as a proxy verifier takes slightly longer (105ms or 545ms) due to the required re-keying of the provided tag. Note, however, that the generation of the re-key by the CA is fast (5ms or 22ms).
Evaluating the performance of a scheme is important to demonstrate its viability. For example, in the UK, Transport for London (TfL) [49] has a requirement for the verification of contactless payment cards used for travelling to be below 500ms in order to avoid congestion at ticket barriers. Given the above performance figures and ignoring any latency introduced by the communication channel, our ASSO with proxy re-verification scheme is well below this requirement for r Bits = 256. For r Bits = 638, only the proxy re-verification is slightly slower (545ms) than the required 500ms. However, the computation costs and communication cost at gates in a station may not be so suitable for portable devices such as mobile phone or smart card, and so this work can be seen as an initial step. Given that our implementation has not been optimised for any specific elliptic curve, additional improvements in speed should be possible, and further research is needed in this direction. However, with the developing communications network including LTE and 5G, better transport connectivity on trains and at stations and the power of cloud computing and handheld devices, these computation and communication costs might not be a such a barrier in the future.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a new ASSO with proxy re-verification scheme is proposed which protects users' privacy and allows a user to authenticate herself to a designated verifier anonymously. A central authority can authorize new verifiers to authenticate the user in cases where proxy verification is needed. The re-key enables the proxy verifier to verify tickets on behalf of the original ticket verifier on the specified day. However, the proxy verifier cannot use the re-key to verify tickets with different travel days on behalf of the original verifier. Furthermore, our scheme is formally treated in terms of definition, security model and security proof and its performance has been empirically evaluated.
This work represents one more step in the direction of defining a scheme that provides strong security and privacy properties in the context of smart ticketing. We constructed our scheme using the most efficient pairing (Type-III pairing) available, but the computation cost and communication cost may be not suitable for portable devices, e.g. mobile phone, smart card, tablet, etc. Further research is needed to optimise the scheme's construction to minimize the use of pairings in order to potentially improve the efficiency of the scheme and the associated performance of the implementation in order to align to the requirements for verification of contactless payment cards [49] . An alternative approach to improve performance is to construct an ASSO with proxy re-verification scheme which does not rely on bilinear groups and this is an interesting area of future work.
The rail industry is particularly focused on addressing problems associated with disruption and the issues surrounding the sharing of passenger details. Addressing these two concerns is challenging because of the separation of information held by third party retailers and rail service providers. Retailers know about passenger travel information but do not necessarily know about events likely to affect the journey whereas rail service providers know about service disruptions but do not necessarily have the details to contact the passengers who might be affected and hence cannot warn them. Our future research directions will explore using the techniques presented in this paper to facilitate privacy-preserving sharing of passenger details between different parties in the event of disruptions.
